human activities. Politicians sometimes have to choose implicitly between peace and war, the judgment of physicians affects the wellbeing of their patients and admission committees select future doctors and scientists. Judges usually believe that it is at least possible for their judgments to be correct or nearly correct. Unsuccessful or inconsistent judgments or those that are at odds with one's own are considered to be due to inexperience, incompetence, or even bad intention. But in fact judgment has repeatedly been shown to be unreliable; even that of the same indivi dual fluctuates widely between occasions. The consequences of the extent to which this occurs are unlikely to be less important in clinical situations than elsewhere.
Diagnosis, severity ofdepression, andprescribing
Much of the very information on which physicians rely in making their judgments is unreliable and uncertain; because it may often not be known which part of the available information is really relevant to diagnostic or therapeutic decisions, the physician must try to make â€˜¿ adequate decisions with inadequate information' (Elstein ci ' al, 1978) .
Many diagnostic cues may be redundant; social stereotypes and prejudices may play an important role in determining what information is collected. Thus agreement between psychiatrists about diagnosis is usually small (for a review see Kendell, 1975) , as is that about evaluation of the severity of the illness.
There appear to be good grounds for believing that physicians evaluate and prescribe for depressive states according to principles additional to those usually taught or mentioned in textbooks, but it is not known to what extenttheydo so,nor how the strategies of different physicians differ. One may also ask whether they make use of definite symptom patterns, and whether the variables involved are used overtly or covertly. Prescribing is not only influenced by pharma cological considerations but also by personal factors such as the educational qualifications and the degree of orientation of the physician towards the whole patient (Joyce ci' al, 1967; Hemminski, 1975) . Experi mental investigations of the strategies of physicians are rare, especially in prescribing (Henry eta!, 1976) .
Decisions about diagnosis and prescribing require the rating of behaviour (a supposedly more objective procedure, although the extent of disagreement between observers has been repeatedly studied) as a preliminary totheintegration of this information into a judgment (an admittedly subjective process). The present work was not concerned with rating behaviour as such,but was purposelyfocussedon the way in which such ratings are put together to form a judg ment; i.e. with clinical thinking at its most detached and presumably most effective.
In Summary: Fifteen general physicians were given profiles of symptom combin ations representing 80 depressedpatients. They were asked to judge the severity of the disorder and to prescribe. There were two phases to the experiment, the formal structure of both being the same. In the first phase, all physicians based their judgments only on the cues of the Hamilton Depression scale; in the second, each physician defined his own cues. Multivariate regression analysis was applied to the observations. Agreement between the judges was low. Most had a more complex policy, in regard to both judgment of the severity of the depression and prescribing, when selecting their own cues than when restricted to textbook variables, but used it more consistently. The observations have important implications for training and research in psychiatry and in psycho pharmacology.
special training in psychiatry usually see the depressed patient first. The diagnostic and prescribing policies of such physicians were the subject of the present study.
Thephysicians

Content characteristics oft/ic tasks
There were two main phases to the study, following a practice task, in both of which physicians were required to judge the severity of depression experi enced by each case, and to prescribe. The tasks in both phases had the same formal characteristics, but the content varied (that is to say, the distribution of numerical values was identical but the labels of the variables differed). In the first phase all physicians were supplied with the eight variables based by the authors upon the Hamilton depression rating scale (HDRS: Hamilton, 1967) .
The version employed was somewhat condensed from that published, the scoring and method of use of which were individually discussed with the partici pants. The three items concerned with insomnia (initial, middle and delayed) were combined into the single item â€˜¿ disturbance of sleep'; general somatic symptoms, gastrointestinal symptoms and hypo chondriasis were condensed to â€˜¿ somatic and psycho somatic complaints related to the depression'*; and anxiety, psychic symptoms, and anxiety, somatic symptoms, to â€˜¿ anxiety, psychic and somatic'. Loss of libido, loss of weight and loss of insight were omitted, because in an earlier investigation with the HDRS in the same region of Switzerland, all patients had insight into the psychic origin of their illness, hardly ever gave information about their sexual life and rarely suffered loss of weight. The item diurnal variation was omitted altogether because the relationship between this factor and severity of depression is far from clear (see review by Chen, 1979) . The items retardation and agitation were condensed to the single bipolar variable â€˜¿ psychomotor deviation from the norm'.
Two experienced independent psychiatrists con firmed that the random generation of cue values had not led to self-contradictory symptom combinations, and that the stimulus materials were thus equivalent to those that could have been derived from real patients.
In the second phase each doctor was asked to describe the variables he or she personally considered most important for the diagnosis of severity of depression and for the prescription of antidepressive medication. To do this, each was first encouraged to think aloud in an individual non-directive interview. Some mentioned as many as 12 different variables, which were easily reduced by agreement to 8 or fewer because of the high degree of redundancy. Each then also predicted his own relative @3-weights. To do so, a pie-diagram divided into 16 segments was presented as an analogue for the total amount of information
Methods
Sixteen physicians known to one of the authors (H.U.F.), who was working at the time as a psychiatric consultant, were invited to participate and 15 agreed to do so. Eleven were working as general practitioners, three in a hospital setting, and one in both. Two were women; seven were between 31 and 40 years old, six between 41 and 50 and two between 51 and 60. Six had had 5 to 10 years of professional activity since their final exams; five, 11 to 20 years and four, 21 to 30 years. The great majority had received their medical training at the University of ZUrich. All had an active interest in psychiatric problems. Strict anonymity was maintained in regard to the judgments provided by the individual physicians, who were identified only by a code number and sent their results to a firm of public accountants for forwarding to H.U.F.
Analysis
The observations were submitted to the form of multiple regression analysis used by Hammond and his colleagues (Hammond et a!, 1975; Hammond and Adelman, 1976; Hammond and Joyce, 1977) .
Simulated patients: Formal task characteristics
Neither real patients, videotape nor film (Kendell, 1973) can be used for an experiment in which identical observations must be presented to all the participants, because the observers will have already started making different inferences at the stage of observation itself. In the present study, global judgments based on identical information were required; a simple form of presentation was therefore sufficient.
Each sheet of a small booklet contained information about one â€˜¿ case'. There were 49 cases, 31 of which were duplicated in order to provide an additional check on consistency; 80 sets of data were therefore presented in all. Each of 8 variables was represented by a vertical bar, of which the length was proportional to the value of the cue (i.e. the intensity of the symptom). Though they could equally well have been obtained from ratings of actual patients, the values of the variables were generated by a random process that disposed the variables orthogonally, distributed the scores widely, and hence produced profiles that were representative of a greater range of patients. All physicians received identical material. Tables 11,111 In both phases, the severity of the depression suffered by each patient was rated on an analogue scale, the ends of which were described respectively as â€˜¿ depression completely absent' and â€˜¿ most severe depression possible'. Any drug or drugs to be pre scribed (the choice was not limited to antidepressives) were recorded beneath this.
Abbreviated in
Analysis ofresults
The consistency of each physician's judgments was examined in two ways (Table I ). R (the multiple regression coefficient) estimated the reliability of the internal structure of the judgments: an R of 1 would indicate that he or she always awarded a given symp tom exactly the same degree of importance in estimat ing the severity of depression, as well as that the overall judgmental policy was completely accounted for in terms of the symptoms and the weights attributed to them. The product-moment coefficient r, on the other hand, represented the extent to which the replicated judgments of the subset of 31 duplicate cases agreed with each other.
R was calculated for each physician in a stepwise linear regression procedure. The criteria for including each new variable were an F-level of >2.5 and a tolerance of > .001. All tolerances were > .7; thus the 8 variables could be considered orthogonal.
Results
Severity of depression
Variation ofjudgments (consistency)
All 15 physicians participated in phase 1, but only 14 in phase 2,becausephysician 8 predicted thathis (or her)policywould still be fullybased upon the modifiedHDRS measures and therefore considered thatitwould be a wasteoftimetotakepartinphase2.
The differences between physicians for R and r were large in both phases 1 and 2 (Table I) . In phase 1, R varied from 0.575(physician 5)to0.888(physician 1);
the extremes of r were represented by the same two physicians and were even greater (0.260 and 0.905 respectively). The mean R was 0.773, indicating that an average of 60 per cent of the variation in judgments was accounted for by the calculated policy. The range of both R and r in phase 2 was narrower, with a considerably higher average: nearly 75 per cent of the variance was contributed, on average, by the calculated policy, with an individual maximum of 87 per cent (physician 3). Within each phase R and r correlated highly with each other (Spearman correlation coefficient +0.721 Multiple regression coefficient R = 1.000 would indicate subject always gives symptom same importance for severity rating, and that weighting of 8 listed symptoms accounts completelyfor overalljudgment.
Correlation r = 1.000 would mean complete agreement between the ratings given the first and second in each pair of 31 duplicated cases.
(phase 1) and +0.666 (phase 2); P <.01). Of the 14 physicians participating in both phases, 12 were more consistent in phase 2 (i.e., when using variables of their own choice) than in phase I, as measured by comparing their R scores; and 11 when r scores were compared instead. This difference in favour of greater consistency in phase 2 is unlikely to have been due to chance (P <.01 for R and <.03 for r). The underlined variables in each row of Table II together account for at least the first 50 per cent of the explained variance in the phase 1 judgments of each physician. Differences in weights awarded by different physicians to the same cues were consider able: for example, less than 0.10 to 0.86 for depressed mood; less than 0.10 to over 0.60 for risk of suicide or anxiety. With the exception of physician 8 all partici pants used depressed mood, and most also used suicide, feelings of guilt and anxiety in diagnosing the severity of depression.
The somatic variables bodily complaints/hypochondria, sleep disturbances and psychomotor deviation from the norm were very little used. Most cues used in phase 2 were identical with or AN EXPERIMENTALSTUDY OF THE CLINICAL JUDGMENT OF GNEERAL PHYSICIANS strongly resembled those of the modified HDRS provided in phase 1 (Table III) , but they were used more consistently in phase 2 (see above). A number of physicians introduced two new variables, namely â€˜¿ general impression' and â€˜¿ loss of drive', and six also named one or two others; for example, the â€˜¿ general history', â€˜¿ feelings of insufficiency', â€˜¿ disturbanceof interpersonal relations'. These were given @3-weights varying between 0.18 and 0.47 (see row â€˜¿ other cues' in Table III ). On the other hand, â€˜¿ feelings of guilt' was not used as a relevant cue by any of them.
Prescribing of antidepressives
Individual physicians prescribed either no drug treatment or only drugs other than antidepressives for between 0 and 88 per cent of the 80 cases, although the prescription of no drug at all was very rare. One individual considered that as many as 9 of the 11 different antidepressive preparations mentioned in total would be needed to cover the spectrum presented by the 80 cases. Five of these were the preferred treatment of different doctors (Table IV) . In phase 1, 10 physicians used imipramine, 3 dibenzepine, one maprotiline and one amitriptyline most frequently. In phase 2 imipraminewas used most frequently by 7 physicians, amitriptyline, maprotiline and diben zepine by 2 each and desipramine by one. Many non antidepressive drugs were also prescribed. Stepwise regression discriminant analysis was used to isolate, for each physician, the core cues for his prescription of different drugs. For simplicity only the cues dis criminating the antidepressive most frequently pre scribed by each doctor from all other antidepressives together were examined.
In phase I, the variables most frequently used to select the preferred medication were the final judgment of the severity of depression (by 9 physicians), de pressed mood (by 7) and risk of suicide (by 4). Target symptoms were used by very few: sleep disturbances and anxiety by 3 each; and feelings of guilt, work disturbances, psychomotor deviation and bodily complaints by 2 each (Table V) . Severity of depression, initially the dependent variable (Tables II and V) , formed an additional independent variable in the judgment of prescribing (Tables III and VI) .
The use of all variables, especially that of target symptoms, showed a reduction in phase 2. Certain variables were sometimes exclusively used to decide the treatment (e.g. â€˜¿ work and occupational distur bances' by physician number 5), but only 3 new variables (â€˜generalimpression' by 3, and â€˜¿ loss of drive' and â€˜¿ anamnesis' by 1 each) were used to any great extent (Table VI) . Further cues introduced were little used for prescribing.
Agreetnent
between physicians Although the agreement between physicians about the judgment of severity was low (Tables II and III) , judgment of severity was most important in pre scribing (Tables V and VI) . It is therefore not sur prising that there was wide variation between physi cians in the choice of treatment for each case. How ever, the observation that the agreement between physicians was so low runs strongly against clinical intuition. The estimates of consistency were therefore submitted to a sensitivity analysis. Eleven of the 14 physicians had predicted their own use of fl-weights for phase 2 using the pie-diagram. These values were substituted for the calculated fl-weights in the regression equation. Similar calculations were also carried out substituting random and equal fl-weights respectively.
Whereas in phase 2 the average variance accounted for by obtaining fl-weights experimentally represented 75 per cent of the total (Table I) , the weights predicted by the physicians (using the pie-diagram) accounted for only 49 per cent, equal fl-weights for 25 per cent and random fl-weights for 22 per cent respectively.
Discussion
Most approaches to the study of medical judgment (see, for example, Feinstein, 1967; Dc Dombal, 1978; Elstein et al, 1978) are academic; few, if any, study what clinicians do and fewer still are concerned with how they could do it better in practice. There is an emphasis on hierarchical, or algorithmic, analyses that may work well in a research setting, but give little practical help to the busy practitioner. On the other hand, the use of relatively simple mathematical procedures allows information to be more consistently combined than is possible by unaided human judgment (Dawes and Corrigan, 1974) , as has been shown in many different contexts, such as admission committees for student psychologists (Dawes, 1971) , radiologists (Slovicet al, 1971) ,rheumatologists (Joyce et a!, 1977) and others. Such analyses are of interest for several reasons: they allow the individual to gain insight into his own judgmental process; they con sequently permit the description of areas of disagree ment between judges and the reasons for this; and they may also be used to increase the reliability of the individual's judgment on subsequentoccasions.
These points mean for the busy doctor that, even if he is working alone, he can (with the aid of the analysis proposed) apply his diagnostic and prescribing skills consistently;
if he is one of a team, the team can define its group policy explicitly and ensure that it is consistently used, by undertaking the appropriate analysis. 
Judgment depends upon the acquisition of reliable information and its combination. By using standL ardized sets of information here, the well-known problems associated with variations between observers of the same phenomena were avoided, and two different strategies injudging the severity of depression and in prescribing (respectively relying upon cues from the textbook HDRS and those of the physicians' own choice) could be directly compared.
It may be objected (as it has been already in other contexts) that judgment about pieces of paper in the quiet of the study is a poor analogy for clinical decisions about patients in the heat of the surgery.
Decisions combine rating of behaviour with the integration of this information. This study was deliberately concerned only with the latter. Many other investigations have shown that in judgments about a complex system, multiple R's and correlations between repeated measures are low and that, as here, the judge actually uses fewer variables than he believes. Depending upon the nature of the cues it may be appropriate to treat some relationships as non-linear, but more complex analyses seldom lead to more accurate simulatioiiof the judgmental process, although this is not to say that human judgment actually functions in this simple manner (Dawes and Corrigan, 1974) .
The observation that 75 per cent of the variance in phase 2 was accounted for by the physicians' observed policies indicates that the relatively simple analysis was, as expected, strong and effective. The introduction of higher-order terms in the regression equation gave little improvement, and no encouragement to any desire to examine more complex analyses, such as hierarchical systems ofjudgment. In psychiatry, judgmental systems have only a small degree of internal structure and consistency; this is one reason for the proliferation of systems for categorizing patients (Gift et a!, 1980) . Thus, the low multiple R's for estimation of severity in phase 1 are not surprising. Such a result also agrees with that from studies with physicians in other specialities (Hammond and Joyce, 1977; Joyce et a!, 1977) . In phase 1, textbook variables, as taught in medical schools, were used. The judges in the present study were not medical students but experienced physicians obliged to cope daily with the evaluation and treatment of depression. Such physicians presumably base their policies to some extent on their personal experiences (Basagni et a!, 1977) , and these can only be partially represented by the HDRS. In phase 2, where the physicians chose their own variables, l2of 14 showed greater consistency than they had done in phase 1. It is improbable that this was simply due to the participants having learned the formal properties of the system during the course of phase 1. Had this been so, an even bigger difference should have been observed between the practice period and phase 1 and this was not the case.
The differences between the content of the variables in the two experimental phases were not very large.
In phase 2 only two new variables were widely employed : â€˜¿ general impression' and â€˜¿ loss of drive'. Others were used by certain physicians. Though two physicians referred to â€˜¿ feelings ofguilt' as an important cue during subsequent discussion of phase 2, none of the 14 had in fact used this variable. This was in striking contrast to phase 1, where it had been used by 11 physicians, some giving it a rather high weight.
This item may therefore reflect the difference between a textbook diagnosis and real diagnosis as performed by the practitioner. Grinker Ct a! (1961) have pointed out that the phenomenology of depression is changing, although textbooks still abide by the descriptions of Kraepelin. Zung has excluded guilt from his scale, because it proved to be culture-specific (Zung, 1977) . Its value as at least a specific cue for the diagnosis of depression has been questioned (Harrow and Amdur, 1971) . In a recently computed depression rating scale (Mont gomery and Asberg, 1979) the much broader term â€˜¿ pessimistic thoughts' has been used. Shapiro con cludes his critical review of empirical work on this question: â€oe¿ (a) feelings of guilt had to be expressed in general and not specific form; and (b) expressions of severe guilt would fail to differentiate neurotic depressives from nondepressivesâ€• (Shapiro, 1979) .
In choosing between antidepressives, physicians attributed little importance in either phase to pub lished or advertised differences between drugs, especially in regard to their reported specificity for target symptoms. The present observations thus implicitly supported the views expressed in some critical reviews of clinical psychopharmacology (e.g. Bielski and Friedel, 1976) .
In most experiments on clinical judgment, the judges are given the cues considered by experts to be relevant.
However, if each judge combines and uses the information in his own way, standard cues will not be able to reflect his policy fully. Therefore, it is not surprising if a judge under such conditions appears to perform poorly. Most clinical rating scales, including the HDRS, attribute an almost equal weight to each symptom (the depth of the depression being estimated by the arithmetic sum of the symptom scores) with little if any theoretical justification. This practice might appear to be defensible on the grounds that equally valid predictions can often be obtained from random, or at least equal, cue weights (Dawes and Corrigan, 1974) . However, the judges in the present study, as in others, characteristically attributed very different weights to symptoms, and calculations using random or equal weights gave very much poorer results.
Some implications for clinical research and practice, as well as for medical education, are worth con sidering. Differences between individual strategies may markedly influence the comparability of ratings in multicentre investigations (Stewart et al, 1975; Hammond and Joyce, 1977; Joyce et al, 1977) , and the desirability of analyses being based upon scores deriving from the widely differing policies of individual physicians seems questionable. It would appear to be worthwhile to obtain a generally agreed set of weights from an appropriate group of judges for the HDRS and other rating scales.
Such weights if used clinically or for research purposes should give much more sensitive, reproducible and responsible evaluations of the severity of depression than is presently the case. The argument can be extended to measurements of variables in other indications than depression.
If qualified psychiatrists were also to show differ ences of a similar magnitude to those reported here in their weighting of items in the HDRS or other measures, it would also be necessary to examine the policies of even these specialists as a preliminary to achieving an explicit consensus before they partici pated in multicentre trials or other investigations. If retraining were necessary, should it be based upon a consensus derived from the participating group (Joyce et a!, 1977) or of some more representative, or authoritative group? Is it more, or less, necessary to teach students textbook variables, if the present evidence that subsequent experience causes them to be rejected is valid? Similar questions can be asked about postgraduate education and recertification (Relman, 1979) . Medical teaching (which may differ from school to school or teacher to teacher) is largely concerned with the content of textbook variables as such and has generally been less interested in the systematic way in which that content is organized (Hammond, 1971) .
But apart from the value of the present approach to education or to the improvement of clinical trials, it is relevant to medical practice as well. The success with which the individual physician carries out his own desired intentions is usually variable, because the consistency of his judgments is low. By studying it more intensively with the help of the simple technique used here, he will be able to apply his own therapeutic policies more reliably; even if these are not always identical with those of his colleagues.
